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A PROGRESSIVE MIND: LOUIS D. BRANDEIS AND THE 
ORIGINS OF FREE SPEECH 
Elizabeth Todd Byron 
 
For a law review audience, I want to stress that the research 
presented in this article is historical in argument first and foremost.  
Understanding the historical context of the post-World War I era is 
crucial to understanding Louis D. Brandeis’ emerging First 
Amendment jurisprudence.  He was a prominent intellectual minority 
of the early 1900s who grasped the importance of protecting the 
fundamental right of free speech in a political democracy for 
minorities and the general political culture.   
Historical context explains the climate and norms for each 
time period.  For example, the first line of the United States 
Constitution reads “We the People of the United States.”1  In 1789, 
who did “We the People” include?  It meant white, educated males 
who owned property, belonged to the church, and were over twenty-
one years of age.2  It did not include the bulk of African Americans, 
who would not be guaranteed the full protections of the United States 
Constitution until the states ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in 
 
Elizabeth Todd Byron is the Social Studies Department Chair at the J. Graham Brown 
School in Louisville, Kentucky. She received a B.A. in French and History, with highest 
honors, summa cum laude, from Transylvania University in 2010. As a 2011 James Madison 
Fellow, she received her M.A. in History and M.A. in Teaching from the University of 
Louisville. She is currently working on her Ph.D. in Leadership in Higher Education at 
Bellarmine University. She completed this research for her M.A. in History thesis in 2013 
under the enduring and brilliant guidance of her mentor, Dr. Thomas Mackey.   
1 U.S. CONST. pmbl. 
2 Ed Crews, Voting in Early America, COLONIAL WILLIAMSBURG, 
http://www.history.org/Foundation/journal/Spring07/elections.cfm (last visited Nov. 18, 
2016) (explaining the voting rules in Colonial Williamsburg); see also Steven Mintz, 
Winning the Vote: A History of Voting Rights, THE GILDER LEHRMAN INST. OF AM. HIST., 
https://www.gilderlehrman.org/history-by-era/government-and-civics/essays/winning-vote-
history-voting-rights (last visited Nov. 18, 2016) (explaining that the Constitution originally 
left the issue of voting rights to the states). 
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1868.3  It did not include women, who would not be granted suffrage 
until the states ratified the Nineteenth Amendment in 1920.4  It also 
did not include Native Americans, who would not receive United 
States citizenship until 1924.5  In 2016, who does “We the People” 
include?  Over time, the concept of “We the People” has evolved 
expanding the rights of the United States Constitution to a broader set 
of people.  
A second example of the importance of historical context can 
be seen in the changing meaning of the term, progressive.  During the 
time period of United States history that is considered to be the actual 
Progressive Era, from the late 1890s through the 1910s, the 
progressives pushed for anti-monopoly legislation; child labor laws; 
voter reform; structural changes, such as the recall and referendum; 
and municipal improvements.6  Securing the vote for women and 
desegregating society did not fit into this particular progressive era.7  
Fast-forward 100 years; what is a progressive today?  In the 2016 
presidential campaign, each candidate would give a separate 
definition of what being a progressive entails.8  The point is that the 
historical context of the 2010s varies greatly from that of the 1910s, 
where this First Amendment story begins.9  
 
3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1; This Day in History: 14th Amendment Adopted, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/14th-amendment-adopted (last visited Dec. 23, 
2016). 
4 U.S. CONST. amend. XIX; This Day in History: 19th Amendment Adopted, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/19th-amendment-adopted (last visited Dec. 23, 
2016). 
5 8 U.S.C. § 1401(b) (2012); This Day in History: The Indian Citizenship Act, HISTORY, 
http://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/the-indian-citizenship-act (last visited Dec. 23, 
2016). 
6 Henry J. Sage, The Progressive Era: The Great Age of Reform, SAGE AM. HIST. 
http://sageamericanhistory.net/progressive/topics/progressive.html (last updated Dec. 13, 
2013); see generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 
(8th ed. 1955); ARTHUR S. LINK, WOODROW WILSON AND THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1910-1917 
(Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1954). 
7 Femi Lewis, African-Americans in the Progressive Era, ABOUT EDUCATION, 
http://afroamhistory.about.com/od/segregation/p/African-Americans-In-The-Progressive-
Era.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2016); see generally CHRISTINE LUNARDINI, FROM EQUAL 
SUFFRAGE TO EQUAL RIGHTS: ALICE PAUL AND THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S PARTY, 1910-1928 
(1986). 
8 Nicole Gaudiano, Hillary Clinton, Bernie Sanders Battle Over the Meaning of 
‘Progressive,’ USA TODAY, 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2016/02/03/new-hampshire-voters-
question-clinton-sanders-town-hall/79751570/ (last visited Dec. 23, 2016). 
9 See generally ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR., FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES (5th ed. 
1941). 
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When the United States entered World War I in April 1917, 
Americans had a limited sense of civil liberties, even by their 
standards.10  That limited scope can be seen dating back to the 
beginnings of the United States.  In 1798, only seven years after the 
Bill of Rights were ratified, Congress enacted, and President John 
Adams signed, the Alien and Sedition Acts to suppress the dissenting 
opinions of Jeffersonians during the war with France.11  In response, 
a group of state legislators created the Kentucky and Virginia 
Resolutions to strike back at the acts; however, no judicial remedy 
existed to deem the Alien and Sedition Acts unconstitutional.12  The 
absence of protections for free political speech continued through the 
Civil War and Reconstruction period, during which time the freedom 
of speech was suppressed both in the Southern states and by the 
Lincoln administration in the North and Midwest.13  A “civil liberties 
consciousness” was limited due to the fact that the Federal Bill of 
Rights only applied to the federal government.14  States and localities 
dealt with rights, if they dealt with them at all.15  No culture of rights 
consciousness existed.16  The concept of the federal judiciary 
applying the Federal Bill of Rights against the states and individuals 
within the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a process called incorporation, would not be completed 
until the “rights revolution” by the Warren Court in the 1960s.17  
 
10 Civil Liberties in Wartime, SHAREAMERICA (Apr. 6, 2015), 
https://share.america.gov/civil-liberties-wartime/.  
11 Alien and Sedition Acts: Defining American Freedom, CONST. RTS. FOUND., 
https://www.loc.gov/rr/program/bib/ourdocs/Alien.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2016). 
12 Virginia Resolution – Alien and Sedition Acts, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/virres.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2016); Kentucky 
Resolutions – Alien and Sedition Acts, THE AVALON PROJECT, 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/kenres.asp (last visited Dec. 29, 2016); see also 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) (holding, for the first time, that “[t]he judicial 
power of the United States is extended to all cases arising under the constitution” and the 
Supreme Court is bound to decide cases according to the Constitution rather than the 
conflicting law).  
13 Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 955, 
971-72 n.144 (1912). 
14 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1. 
15 See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 at 67-68, 70 (1872).  
16 Id. at 52, 67-68, 70 
17 Steven J. Wermiel, Rights in the Modern Era: Applying the Bill of Rights to the States, 
1 WM & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 121, 128 (1992) (“[C]ase after case comes to the court which 
finds the individual battling to vindicate a claim under the Bill of Rights against the powers 
of government, federal and state.”). 
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Therefore, during the total war effort of World War I, the 
United States government enacted the Espionage Act of 1917 and 
Sedition Act of 1918, which prohibited Americans from speaking out 
against the draft, military action, and/or the United States 
government.18  In doing so, Congress empowered the Attorney 
General to arrest radicals who protested any aspect of the war 
effort.19  Public opinion overwhelmingly supported these policies 
because the public viewed the policies as reasonable protective 
measures during wartime.20  Following the war, the Supreme Court 
heard numerous cases arising from these war policies.21  Louis D. 
Brandeis played a key role in shaping the eventual jurisprudence for 
the freedom of speech in the United States through his judicial 
opinions in the cases Abrams v. United States,22 in which he 
concurred with the dissenting opinion, Gilbert v. State of 
Minnesota,23 in which he wrote the dissenting opinions, and Whitney 
v. California,24 in which he wrote the concurring opinion. 
The case that set the stage for free speech jurisprudence post 
World War I was Schenck v. United States.25  Charles Schenck was 
arrested and convicted for printing and mailing leaflets that were 
deemed to incite anti-war action; specifically, he urged men to resist 
the draft.26  His lawyers appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States, contending that the First Amendment protected the 
 
18 Sedition Act of 1918. Pub. L. No. 65-150, 40 Stat. 553 (1918) (repealed 1921); 
Espionage Act of 1917, Pub. L. No. 65-24, 40 Stat. 217 (1917) (codified as amended at 18 
U.S.C. § 794 (1996)).  
19 Home Front, War Front: Sewanee and Fort Oglethorpe in World War I: Espionage & 
Sedition Acts, SEWANEE U. OF THE SOUTH, 
http://library.sewanee.edu/c.php?g=118671&p=773219 (last updated Dec. 8, 2015). 
20 Chafee, supra note 13, at 960 (explaining that “speech should be unrestricted” during 
wartime “unless it is clearly liable to cause direct and dangerous interference” with the war). 
21 See Steven M. Feldman, Free Speech, World War I, and Republican Democracy: The 
Internal and External Holmes, 6 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 192, 207 (2008). 
22 250 U.S. 616 (1919). 
23 254 U.S. 325, 336 (1920) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (explaining that some rights are 
guaranteed protection by the federal government and the statute in question was infringing 
on those rights). 
24 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis J., concurring) (“[T]he due process clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of 
procedure.  Thus all fundamental rights comprised within the term liberty are protected by 
the federal Constitution from invasion by the states.  The right of free speech, the right to 
teach and the right of assembly are, of course, fundamental rights.”). 
25 249 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1919). 
26 Id. at 49. 
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distribution of the circulars.27  On March 3, 1919, the Supreme Court 
upheld Schenck’s conviction and affirmed the judgments of the lower 
courts in a unanimous vote.28  Associate Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes, Jr. wrote the opinion for the Court.29  In assessing the claim 
of the First Amendment right in print materials, Holmes declared that 
the privilege was limited when there was a “clear and present danger” 
in the speech or print.30  Holmes applied the “question of proximity” 
criminal law standard to the Schenck case by doing a thorough 
analysis of the leaflet.31  Specific quotes that Holmes referred to in 
the leaflet included, “ ‘Assert Your Rights.’ . . . ‘your right to assert 
your opposition to the draft,’ . . . ‘If you do not assert and support 
your rights, you are helping to deny or disparage rights which it is the 
solemn duty of all citizens and residents of the United States to 
retain.’ ”32  In the opinion of the Supreme Court, these statements not 
only expressed the views of the Socialists, but these statements called 
on American citizens to act directly.33  By sending the leaflets to 
drafted men, the Supreme Court could find no other intention for the 
flyer than calling on these men to refuse the draft and stay home in 
violation of the Sedition Act.34 
However, while Holmes emphasized that such a leaflet would 
not be ruled unconstitutional in peace times, he insisted: 
[T]he character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which 
it is done.  The most stringent protection of free speech would not 
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.  
It does not even protect a man from an injunction against uttering 
words that may have all the effect of force.35 
Thus, even out of wartime, Holmes deemed any speech that 
put others in danger was not protected under the First Amendment.36  
Notice that Holmes did not say a crowded theatre; indeed, he 
believed that even if one person was endangered as a result of 
 
27 Id. at 51. 
28 Id. at 48, 53. 
29 Id. at 48. 
30 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 51.  
33 Id. at 50-51. 
34 Id. at 52-53. 
35 Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52 (citations omitted). 
36 Id. 
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someone else’s speech then the Court would rule it unconstitutional.37  
The fact that his opinion went beyond war times to peacetime 
examples, such as someone shouting fire in a theater, set an important 
precedent for the Supreme Court in ruling on the freedom of speech 
in the following years and decades.  
The Supreme Court applied the clear and present danger test 
to several cases following the Schenck case, including Frohwerk v. 
United States38 and Debs v. United States.39  In hindsight, both 
Associate Justices Holmes and Brandeis vocalized regret in their 
initial rulings on freedom of speech cases coming out of World War 
I.40  In a letter to Harvard Law Professor Felix Frankfurter, Brandeis 
exclaimed, “I have never been quite happy about my concurrence in 
the Debs and Schenck cases.  I had not then thought the issues of 
freedom of speech out.  I thought at the subject, not through it.”41  
Fortunately the Abrams case argued later that year allowed Brandeis 
and Holmes a fresh opportunity, a second bite at the judicial apple, to 
reexamine the issue of the freedom of speech and the First 
Amendment even in wartime.42  
A major difference between the Abrams and Schenck cases 
was that Jacob Abrams, Mollie Steimer, Hyman Lachowsky, Samuel 
Lipman, and Jacob Schwartz were Russian immigrants in the United 
States, whereas Charles Schenck was an American citizen.43  As 
young Russian and Jewish immigrants, they all found jobs in 
factories under working class conditions from 1908-1913.44  
Unsatisfied with their position in America, they began to join 
together with other frustrated workers to create an anarchist 
organization to fight against government regulations and poor 
working conditions.45  Their organization became politicized due to 
 
37 Id. (“The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely 
shouting fire in a theatre and causing a panic.”). 
38 249 U.S. 204, 207-08 (1919). 
39 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919). 
40 Id. at 216; Frohwek, 249 U.S. at 208-09. 
41 Stephen A Smith, Schenck v. United States and Abrams v. United States, in FREE 
SPEECH ON TRIAL: COMMUNICATION PERSPECTIVES ON LANDMARK SUPREME COURT 
DECISIONS 20, 26 (Richard A. Parker ed., 2003).  
42 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 619. 
43 RICHARD POLENBERG, FIGHTING FAITHS: THE ABRAMS CASE, THE SUPREME COURT, AND 
FREE SPEECH 4 (1987). 
44 Id. at 4, 11. 
45 Id. at 22, 23. 
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the Russian Revolution of 1917.46  These anarchists longed for 
political change in Russia.47  In order to publicize their opposition to 
the American intervention in the Russia Revolution, Abrams and the 
others wrote and distributed two leaflets.48  The police arrested the 
anarchists and took them to federal court where they were found 
guilty of violating the Espionage Act.49  When their lawyers appealed 
their case to the United States Supreme Court, the justices affirmed 
the lower court ruling in a vote of 7-2.50  After having decided 
Schenck just a few months before, the Supreme Court went into this 
case with the judicial doctrine of the clear and present danger test.51  
Associate Justice John H. Clark wrote the majority opinion declaring 
that sufficient evidence established the defendants’ guilt.52   
However, Holmes dissented in Abrams with the support of 
Brandeis; he dissented from the doctrine he had crafted earlier that 
same year in Schenck.53  Holmes stated “the United States 
constitutionally may punish speech that produces or is intended to 
produce a clear and imminent danger that it will bring about 
forthwith certain substantive evils that the United States 
constitutionally may seek to prevent.”54  In constructing such a rule, 
Holmes dissented from his previous opinion of Schenck by modifying 
the broad clear and present danger standard rule into the much 
narrower “imminently threaten” doctrine.55  Holmes and Brandeis 
referred to the postscript on the first leaflet that contended that the 
Russian authors were not trying to support the Germans.56  The 
postscript read, “It is absurd to call us pro-German.  We hate and 
despise German militarism more than do you hypocritical tyrants.”57  
Holmes and Brandeis pointed out that the postscript constituted clear 
evidence that the defendants were not trying to interfere with the 
 
46 Id. at 26. 
47 Id.  
48 POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 49-52. 
49 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616-17.  
50 Id. at 624, 631.  
51 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627; Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.  
52 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 616, 624. 
53 Id. at 624, 626, 628-31(Holmes, J., dissenting). 
54 Id. at 627 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
55 Id. at 627, 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52.  
56 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 628 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
57 Id. at 625 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
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United States’ war with Germany.58  The defendants only sought to 
raise awareness of the situation in Russia.59 
Louis Brandeis spent the nine months between the Schenck 
and Abrams cases doing what he did best, reviewing the facts and 
examining the constitutional right of freedom of speech through a 
progressive lens.60  In response to Holmes’s dissenting opinion, 
Brandeis stated, “I join you heartily & gratefully.”61  Yet, while the 
Abrams case allowed Brandeis to think through the freedom of 
speech more methodically, it would not be until 1920 that Brandeis 
wrote his own judicial opinion on the matter.62  In 1923, Brandeis 
sent Felix Frankfurter a letter about the Supreme Court rulings on 
Schenck, Frohwerk, and Debs, in which he explained, “Of course you 
must also remember that when Holmes writes, he doesn’t give a 
fellow a chance—he shoots so quickly.”63  Thus, while Brandeis 
concurred with Holmes in judicial opinions on freedom of speech 
cases in 1919, he sought to explain himself on the matter.64  In 1920, 
he had the chance to do so.   
On August 18, 1917, a state jury convicted Joseph Gilbert, 
manager of the Non-partisan League, of violating a Minnesota statute 
that prohibited the obstructing or opposing of men enlisting in the 
United States military.65  The Minnesota statute was enacted on April 
20, 1917, prior to the Federal Selective Service Act and the Federal 
Espionage Act, both of which were passed later that year.66  At a 
public meeting, Gilbert argued:  
      We are going over to Europe to make the world 
safe for democracy, but I tell you we had better make 
America safe for democracy first. . . . If this is such a 
great democracy, for Heaven’s sake why should we 
not vote on conscription of men.  We were stampeded 
 
58 Id. at 628-29 (Holmes, J., dissenting).  
59 Id. at 619-22 (majority opinion). 
60 POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 265-66. 
61 POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 236. 
62 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 334, 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
63 POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 266.  
64 Abrams, 250 U.S. at 627-28, 630-31; POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 266.  
65 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 326-27, 334.  
66 POLENBERG, supra note 43, at 269.  
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into this war by newspaper rot to pull England’s 
chestnuts out of the fire for her.67 
On December 13, 1920, the United States Supreme Court 
upheld the Minnesota Supreme Court decision in a vote of 7-2.68  
Associate Justice Joseph McKenna wrote the opinion for the 
majority.69  The majority of the Supreme Court held that all states had 
the authority to enforce “police power to preserve the peace of the 
State.”70  The Minnesota statute did not hinder the war effort.71  In 
fact, it helped to stifle speech that obstructed the United States during 
the war.72   
Chief Justice Edward White dissented from the majority 
opinion because he believed that “the subject-matter is within the 
exclusive legislative power of Congress, when exerted, and that the 
action of Congress has occupied the whole field.”73  White contended 
that the issue of obstructing enlistment fell under the jurisdiction of 
the Federal United States Congress.74  He believed that the Espionage 
Act of 1918 took priority over any state statute, including the 
Minnesota statute that the jury convicted Gilbert of violating.75  In 
contradiction to Holmes, White wrote that national supremacy 
controlled in this case, not states’ rights.76  White made no reference 
to the freedom of speech argument in his brief dissent.77  
While also dissenting, Brandeis did not vote against Gilbert’s 
conviction for the same reasons as White.  Brandeis explained that 
although the Minnesota statute was technically implemented during 
the war, it was not limited to the war.78  It was to be maintained after 
the war as well.79  To this point, Brandeis contended, “Unlike the 
 
67 Gilbert, 254 U.S. at 327. 
68 Id. at 33-34.   
69 Id. at 326. 
70 Id. at 331.  
71 Id. 
72 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 332-33.   
73 Id. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting); Amanda G. Lewis, Federal Preemption of State and 
Local Laws: State and Local Efforts to Impose Sanctions on Employers of Unauthorized 
Aliens 7, (May 5, 2008) http://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/career-
services/Federal%20Preemption%20of%20State%20and%20Local%20Laws.pdf.   
74 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (White, C.J., dissenting). 
75 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting). 
76 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting). 
77 Id. (White, C.J., dissenting). 
78 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
79 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
9
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[F]ederal Espionage Act, [the Minnesota statute] applies equally 
whether the United States is at peace or at war.  It abridges freedom 
of speech and of the press, not in a particular emergency, in order to 
avert a clear and present danger, but under all circumstances.”80  
Brandeis contended that such a statute affected everyone from 
religious preachers, to school professors, to parents because it 
prohibited them from speaking their beliefs on the subject or advising 
young men whether or not to join the military.81  The statute 
prohibited those who had moral or religious convictions about 
pacifism from teaching their beliefs to others.82  
Upon passage of the Espionage Act in June 1917, two months 
after Minnesota enacted its statute, Brandeis explained that the two 
laws conflicted.83  Brandeis found that the Minnesota statute withheld 
citizens’ rights to discuss their beliefs about enlistment and the war, 
whereas the Espionage Act only prosecuted those who spoke words 
that caused actual detriment to the United States war effort.84  He 
argued that the degree of difference in these two policies was the 
difference between maintaining homeland security and depriving 
citizens of their constitutional rights.85 
In conclusion, Brandeis made one last argument about how 
the Minnesota statute violated the Fourteenth Amendment.  He 
stated: “As the Minnesota statute is in my opinion invalid because it 
interferes with federal functions and with the right of a citizen of the 
United States to discuss them, I see no occasion to consider whether 
it violates also the Fourteenth Amendment.”86  This final point in 
Brandeis’ minority opinion set the stage for the case of Gitlow v. New 
York,87 which would apply the freedom of speech to the states.88  The 
Gilbert case is important to this study because it offered the first 
opportunity for Brandeis to clarify his understanding of the freedom 
of speech.89 
 
80 Id. (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Feldman, supra note 21, at 208-10. 
81 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334-35 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
82 Id. at 335 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
83 Id. at 336, 338, 340-41 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
84 Id. at 335-36 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
85 Id. at 336-37(Brandeis, J., dissenting).   
86 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 343 (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Wermiel, supra note 17, at 125-26. 
87 268 U.S. 652 (1925).  
88 Id. at 666. 
89 Gilbert, 245 U.S. at 334 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
10
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On November 28, 1919, California authorities arrested Anita 
Whitney for crimes under the California Criminal Syndicalism Act, 
enacted on April 30, 1919.90  Whitney is the final case in this study 
because it demonstrates the epitome of Brandeis’ influence on the 
jurisprudence of free speech.91  In his judicial opinion, Brandeis 
wrote eloquently about the scope of the First Amendment.92  In 
Whitney, Brandeis solidified his understanding of the crucial role of 
free speech in a political democracy.93   
Unlike the previous two decisions, Anita Whitney’s arrest and 
conviction took place in the post-World War I years.94  Yet, 
California legislators enacted the California Criminal Syndicalism 
Act as a direct result of the war.95  Following World War I, pockets 
of communist groups formed throughout the United States.96  
Americans identified this phenomenon as the Red Scare.97  The 
majority of Americans, including state and federal government 
officials, feared a revolution similar to Russia’s; therefore, individual 
state governments instituted policies that made it illegal for citizens 
to join organizations that advocated for revolutionary activity.98   
In 1919, Whitney joined the Communist Labor Party of 
California.99  Born into a well-known political family, the California 
officials monitored Whitney’s political activity.100  After attending a 
national conference held by the Communist Labor Party in 
California, state officials arrested her for participating in an 
organization that promoted radical revolutionary activity to 
overthrow the current government.101  A county court convicted 
 
90 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 360; H.R.M., Criminal Law: Criminal Syndicalism Act: 
Constitutional Law: Validity of the Act under the Free Speech Clause, 10 CALIF. L. REV. 
512, 512 (1922).   
91 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).   
92 Id. at 376-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
93 Id. at 373-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring).   
94 Id. at 360 (majority opinion); John Graham Royde-Smith & Dennis E. Showalter, 
World War I, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I 
(last updated Dec. 9, 2016).   
95 Whitney v. California – The California Criminal Syndicalism Act, LAW LIBRARY – 
AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL INFORMATION, http://law.jrank.org/pages/22799/Whitney-v-
California-California-Criminal-Syndicalism-Act.html (last visited Dec. 23, 2016).  
96 Id.  
97 Id.  
98 Id.  
99 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 364. 
100 Id. at 363-66. 
101 Id. at 359. 
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Whitney of criminal syndicalism.102  However, Whitney’s lawyer 
appealed the case, arguing that the Criminal Syndicalism Act violated 
the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.103   
On May 16, 1927, the Supreme Court ruled 9-0 in favor of 
upholding Whitney’s conviction.104  Seven justices concurred with 
Associate Justice Sanford’s opinion, but only Holmes concurred with 
Brandeis’ opinion.105  Understanding the differences between the two 
opinions makes Brandeis’ opinion read almost like a dissenting 
opinion.   
Sanford explained the importance of a writ of error.106  He 
reinforced the concept that, according to division of powers in a 
federal system, the United States Supreme Court was not to rule on 
state cases that did not raise a federal question.107  Sanford pointed 
out that Whitney’s lawyer had not raised a federal question originally 
and, therefore, the case did not fall within the Federal Supreme 
Court’s jurisdiction.108   
While supporting Whitney’s conviction, Brandeis did not 
agree with the full reasoning given in Sanford’s opinion.109  Brandeis 
upheld Anita Whitney’s conviction because he agreed that her case 
did not fall within the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.110  Yet, 
outside of the question of jurisdiction, Brandeis used his opinion to 
express his deep thoughts and reflection about the scope of free 
political speech.111   
Brandeis found the California statute to be unconstitutional 
because it went outside the bounds of an “imminent danger.”112  
Imminent danger rested at the heart of his opinion.113  Brandeis 
argued that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
protected the fundamental right of free speech, but he acknowledged 
 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 362.  
104 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 357, 372.  
105 Id. at 359, 372, 380. 
106 Id. at 360.  
107 Id. at 360. 
108 Id. at 362.  
109 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 372-80 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
110 Id. at 380 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
111 Id. at 374-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
112 Id. at 377-78 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
113 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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that this right was “not in their nature absolute.”114  He explained that 
the fundamental right of free speech was subject to restriction if it 
was “intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some 
substantive evil which the state constitutionally may seek to 
prevent.”115 
Basing this case law on the clear and present danger standard 
of Schenck, Brandeis amended the ruling by changing the word 
present to imminent.116  In doing so, he hoped to clarify the Schenck 
standard.117  He agreed that free speech needed to be limited when 
danger loomed in the face of these fundamental rights.118  The 
impending threat of violence or injury to other United States citizens 
overpowered a person’s right to speak.119  However, he contended 
that when an imminent threat was not present, the First Amendment 
protected all Americans in their right to speak freely on political 
issues in a political democracy.120 
To show his concerns about the jurisprudence of fundamental 
freedoms, Brandeis harkened back to the American Revolution and 
the Founding Fathers who created the Constitution in order to 
demonstrate the historical significance of protecting American 
freedoms.121  He wrote: 
[The Founding Fathers] valued liberty both as an end 
and as a means.  They believed liberty to be the secret 
of happiness and courage to be the secret of liberty.  
They believed that freedom to think as you will and 
speak as you think are means indispensable to the 
discovery and spread of political truth; that without 
free speech and assembly discussion would be futile; 
that with them, discussion affords ordinarily adequate 
protection against the dissemination of noxious 
doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an 
inert people; that public discussion is a political duty; 
 
114 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
115 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
116 Id. at 373-74 (Brandeis, J., concurring); see supra note 55 and accompanying text. 
117 Id. at 373-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
118 Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
119 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
120 Id. at 373 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
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and that this should be a fundamental principle of the 
American government.122  
In these powerful statements, Brandeis reminded readers of the 
fundamental values that underlay the United States.123  He argued that 
the Founding Fathers of the United States regarded free speech and 
assembly as the means by which citizens could make their opinions 
and concerns known.124  Without these freedoms, Americans would 
be deprived of the rights that made the American Revolution possible 
in the first place.125  He contended that free speech and assembly 
were part of active citizenship.126  Most importantly, he noted that the 
United States government was responsible for ensuring these 
liberties.127 
Brandeis provided support for his philosophy about the 
Founding Fathers by quoting Thomas Jefferson’s first Inaugural 
Address in which Jefferson declared, “If there be any among us who 
would wish to dissolve this union or change its republican form, let 
them stand undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error 
of opinion may be tolerated where reason is left free to combat it.”128  
Brandeis followed this reference by explaining that the Founders 
acknowledged the possible risks involved in free speech.129  He 
continued: 
[T]hey knew that order cannot be secured merely 
through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is 
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and 
imagination; that fear breeds repression; that 
repression breeds hate; that hate menaces stable 
government; that the path of safety lies in the 
opportunity to discuss freely supposed grievances and 
proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil 
counsels is good ones. . . . Recognizing the occasional 
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the 
 
122 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
123 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).   
124 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
125 Id. at 375-77 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
126 Id. at 375, 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 374-75, 377-79 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
128 Id. at 375 n.3 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
129 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
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Constitution so that free speech and assembly should 
be guaranteed.130   
Brandeis contended that fear of danger or harm that might 
come of free speech was not enough for state and federal 
governments to limit the fundamental rights of free speech of 
American citizens.131  In his now famous quote, he stated, “Men 
feared witches and burnt women.  It is the function of speech to free 
men from the bondage of irrational fears.”132  Brandeis made the 
point that irrational fear, such as with witches in the Middle Ages, 
resulted in the punishment and death of many innocent women who 
did not have the ability to defend themselves.133  Brandeis argued that 
free speech allows people to confront their fears and gain 
understanding of other peoples’ perspectives.134  He explained that 
the only circumstance in which free speech should be limited is when 
a threat is clear and imminent.135  He stated, “[t]o justify suppression 
of free speech there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious 
evil will result if free speech is practiced.  There must be reasonable 
ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent.”136  The 
remedy to counter offensive political speech, Brandeis asserted, was 
more speech, not repression by public authorities.137 
According to the power of judicial review decided in Marbury 
v. Madison,138 Brandeis acknowledged that his role on the Supreme 
Court was to interpret the Constitution according to how the framers 
intended it to be understood.139  Brandeis argued, “if the Founders 
rallied behind the shift from a British monarchy to a republic, then 
 
130 Id. at 375-76 (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
131 Id. at 376, 378 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
132 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
133 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring); Austin Cline, Persecuting Witches and Witchcraft: 
Executing Witches and Eliminating Witchcraft, ABOUT RELIGION, 
http://atheism.about.com/od/christianityviolence/ig/Christian-Persecution-Witches/Witches-
Hanging-Burning.htm (last updated Apr. 2, 2016). 
134 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 377(Brandeis, J., concurring). 
135 Id. at 376 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
136 Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring).  
137 Id. at 377 (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
138 5 U.S. 137, 178-80 (1803). 
139 Whitney, 274 U.S. at 375-78, 380.   
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they would oppose the stifling of conflicting political beliefs at any 
point in time.”140   
Over forty years after Brandeis and Holmes handed down 
their opinion in Whitney, the Supreme Court changed the standard 
from clear and present danger to the imminently threaten standard in 
Brandenburg v. Ohio.141  Although neither Holmes nor Brandeis 
lived to hear the Supreme Court decision in Brandenburg, they 
understood in their lifetime the importance of laying the foundation 
for free speech jurisprudence.  Brandeis’ earnest defense of free 
political speech in the 1920s created the traction for the Supreme 
Court to start grappling with the Founding Fathers’ understanding of 
the First Amendment.142  The Supreme Court decisions in Gitlow and 
Brandenburg drew upon Brandeis’ language and line of reasoning.143  
The legal standards of incorporation and imminent threat demonstrate 
that Brandeis played the key role in the shaping of the jurisprudence 
for the freedom of speech.  
 
 
140 Elizabeth Diane Todd, A Progressive Mind: Louis D. Brandeis and The Origins of 
Free Speech 115 (Apr. 9, 2013) (unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Louisville), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.18297/etd/1446.  
141 395 U.S. 444, 447-49 (1969).  
142 Bradley C. Bobertz, The Brandeis Gambit: The Making of America’s “First 
Freedom,” 1909-1931, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 557, 560-63, 566 (1999). 
143 Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447-49; Gitlow, 268 U.S. at 671. 
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